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Abstract—This paper studies the secrecy performance of
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channels, also
termed as multiple-input multiple-output multiple-eavesdropper
(MIMOME) channels, under transmit antenna selection (TAS)
and BPSK/QPSK modulations. In the main channel between the
transmitter and the legitimate receiver, a single transmit antenna
is selected to maximizes the instantaneous Signal to Noise Ratio
(SNR) at the receiver. At the receiver and the eavesdropper,
selection combination (SC) is utilized. By assuming Rayleigh flat
fading, we first derive the closed-form approximated expression
for the ergodic secrecy rate when the channel state information
of the eavesdropper (CSIE) is available at the transmitter. Next,
analytical formulas for the approximated and asymptotic secrecy
outage probability (SOP) are also developed when CSIE is
unavailable. Besides theoretical derivations, simulation results
are provided to demonstrate the approximation precision of the
derived results. Furthermore, the asymptotic results reveal that
the secrecy diversity order degrades into 0 due to the finite-
alphabet inputs, which is totally different from that driven by
the Gaussian inputs.
Index Terms—MIMOME channel, physical layer security,
transmit antenna selection, BPSK/QPSK
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer (PHY) security has become a pivotal and
pervasive concern in wireless communications due to its
remarkable performance in information security enhancement.
Different from the traditional cryptographic techniques [1],
physical layer security utilizes the inherent characteristics of
wireless channels to ensure reliable transmission. In recent
years, there has been an increasing interest in multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channels, also referred to
as multiple-input multiple-output multiple-eavesdropper (MI-
MOME) channels, where multiple antennas are deployed at
the transmitter, the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper.
The secrecy capacity of MIMOME channels has been
investigated in [2], [3] from an information-theoretic per-
spective. Later, theses works were further extended to large-
scale systems in [4] to declare the significant improvements
of transmission security and reliability in massive MIMOME
channels compared to the small-scale one. Nevertheless, the
deployment of multiple antennas will result in high hardware
cost since each antenna should be connected with an expensive
Radio-Frequency (RF) chain. To settle this challenge, antenna
selection (AS) [5] can be applied into the MIMO wiretap
channels, which can alleviate the requirement on RF chains
by selecting a subset of antennas to transceive signals.
In the past years, many researches on antenna-selection-
aided MIMOME channels were presented [6]–[10]. For ex-
ample, Yang et al., in [6] and [7] derived closed-form expres-
sions for the secrecy outage probability (SOP) in MIMOME
channels under transmit antenna selection (TAS) with or
without the impact of antenna correlation, respectively. Zhu
et al., in [8] studied the probability of zero secrecy capacity
for two TAS schemes depending on the availability of the
eavesdropper’s channel state information (CSI). Later, the
achievable secrecy performance of MIMO wiretap channels
in the presence of imperfect CSI was analyzed in [9]. In
contrast to the explicit analysis in [6]–[9], Asaad et al., in
[10] proposed asymptotically approximated results for both
the average secrecy rate and the SOP in the limit of large-
scale MIMOME systems under the norm-based TAS protocol.
However, all these aforementioned works focused on the
Gaussian input assumption. In fact, an important scenario
which is necessary to be investigated when moving towards a
practical implementation is the case where the channel inputs
are constrained by finite constellation size.
Motivated by this, the works in [11] and [12] firstly stud-
ied the impacts of standard constellations on the achievable
secrecy rates of Gaussian wiretap channels. Recently, most
literatures about the MIMOME channels driven by finite-
alphabet inputs focused on optimal precoding schemes [13],
[14], artificial noise (AN) design [15], [16] or the joint
precoding and AN design [17], while previous studies have
not yet treated the TAS-aided MIMOME channels with finite-
alphabet inputs in detail. Consequently, there is an urgent need
to address the secrecy performance in TAS-aided MIMOME
channels with inputs drawn form discrete constellations.
This paper detailedly analyzed the secrecy performance
for MIMOME channels with transmit antenna selection and
finite-alphabet inputs. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first time to propose a comprehensive theoretical analysis
for the TAS-aided MIMOME channels with finite-alphabet
inputs. For simplicity, assume that the modulation mode is
BPSK/QPSK and the channel side information of the legiti-
mate receiver (CSIL) is available at the transmitter. Closed-
form approximated expressions for the ergodic secrecy rate
and secrecy outage probability are respectively formulated in
two scenarios: 1) For Scenario A: the eavesdropper’s channel
side information is unavailable at the transmitter (NCSIE), and
2) For Scenario B: the eavesdropper’s channel side information
(CSIE) is available. In each scenario, the derivations meet
accurately the results given via numerical simulations. Finally,
we set the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) of the main channel to
infinity and derive the asymptotic secrecy outage probability.
On the basis of the asymptotic SOP, we demonstrate that the
secrecy diversity order [6] for the finite-alphabet inputs is
totally different with that driven by Gaussian inputs due to
the constraint imposed by the discrete signaling inputs.
The remaining parts of this manuscript is structured as
follows: Section II describes the system model. In Section
III, the ergodic secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability of
the MIMOME channel are investigated. The simulation results
and corresponding analysis are shown in Section IV. Finally,
Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider a MIMO wiretap channel, where
the transmitter, the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper
are equipped with NA, NB and NE antennas, respectively. Let
HB and HE denote the main channel and the eavesdropper’s
channel, both of which are suffering independent and identical
distributed (i.i.d.) Rayleigh flat fading with Gaussian noise. For
the sake of brevity, suppose that the elements in the channel
matrix HB ∈ CNB×NA and HE ∈ CNE×NA are i.i.d. complex
Gaussian random variables following CN (0, 1).
Then, consider single antenna selection at the transmitter
and selection combination (SC) at the legitimate receiver,
which is a typical scenario declared in [6]. As a result, a single
transmit/receive antenna pair between the transmitter and the
legitimate receiver is selected to maximize the instantaneous
SNR at the legitimate receiver. Consequently, the index of the
selected antenna at the transmitter is given by
β∗ = argmax
1≤α≤NB,1≤β≤NA
|hB,α,β |, (1)
where hB,α,β represents the element in HB located in the α-
th row and β-th line. Therefore, the magnitude of the main
channel is |fAB| = max1≤α≤NB |hB,α,β∗ |. Furthermore, we
assume that the eavesdropper also performs the SC to receive
the secret message, thus the magnitude of the eavesdropper’s
channel is given by |fAE| = max1≤ξ≤NE |hE,ξ,β∗|, where
hE,ξ,β represents the element in HE.
A. Main channel
After the antenna selection and SC, the received signal at
the legitimate receiver can be written as
yB =
√
γ¯bfABx+ nB, (2)
where x is the transmitted symbol constrained by finite alpha-
bet with unit power, such as BPSK, γ¯b is the average per-
antenna SNR of the main channel and nB ∈ CN (0, 1) is
the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). Let γb denote
the instantaneous SNR at the legitimate receiver, then its
probability density function (PDF) is given by
fb (γb) = NANB
(
1− e−
γb
γ¯b
)NANB−1
e
− γb
γ¯b
1
γ¯b
. (3)
B. Eavesdropper’s channel
The received signal at the eavesdropper is written as
yE =
√
γ¯efAEx+ nE, (4)
where γ¯e is the average per-antenna SNR of the eavesdropper’s
channel and nE ∈ CN (0, 1) is the additive complex Gaussian
noise. Since the eavesdropper only utilizes the antenna cor-
responding to the largest SNR, the PDF of the instantaneous
SNR γe is
fe (γe) = NE
(
1− e− γeγ¯e
)NE−1
e−
γe
γ¯e
1
γ¯e
. (5)
C. Achievable Secrecy Rate
Since QPSK is the superposition of two orthogonal BPSK
modulations, it is sufficient to consider BPSK. Moreover,
Shannon formula log2 (1 + SNR) can not be used for the input
signals do not follow the Gaussian distribution. Assume that
the transmitted data stream are i.i.d. zero-mean binary symbols
with equal probabilities, the input-output mutual information
(MI) in terms of the SNR γ under BPSK modulation over
AWGN channels is formulated as [19]
I (γ) = 1−
∫ +∞
−∞
1√
2pi
e−
u2
2 log2
(
1 + e−2
√
γu−2γ
)
du, (6)
Therefore, the achievable secrecy rate of the wiretap channel
with BPSK modulation is given by [20]
Cs = Is (γb, γe) =
{
I (γb)− I (γe) , γb > γe
0, γb ≤ γe
(7)
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This section will investigate the secrecy performance of the
MIMOME channel under TAS in detail. In the followings,
consider two scenarios stated before depending on whether
the CSIE is available or not, and propose corresponding
performance measurement metric for these cases respectively.
A. CSIE
When the CSIE is available, the ergodic secrecy rate, is
usually utilized to measure the secrecy performance of the
wiretap channel [20], which is formulated as follows:
C¯s =E [Is (γb, γe)]
=
∫ +∞
0
∫ +∞
0
Is (γb, γe) fb (γb) fe (γe) dγbdγe
=
∫ +∞
0
∫ +∞
γe
(I (γb)− I (γe)) fb (γb) fe (γe) dγbdγe.
(8)
Nevertheless, due to the complexity of the expression for the
MI in Equ. (6), the exact value for the ergodic secrecy rate
is hard to calculate. Fortunately, there exists a closed-form
−25 −20 −15 −10 −5 0 5 10 15
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
γ [dB]
M
ut
ua
l I
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
[bp
s/H
z]
 
 
Exact
Approximation
Fig. 1. Comparison of exact and approximated MI of BPSK. The exact and
approximated results are calculated by Equ. (6) and Equ. (9), respectively.
approximated formula for the MI, with a compact form, which
is written as:
I (γ) ≈ 1− e−φγ , (9)
where φ = 0.6507. To examine the approximation precision of
Equ. (9), Fig. 1 compares the exact and approximated input-
ouput MI of BPSK in terms of the SNR. As can be seen from
this figure, the approximation effect is fantastic for all SNR
ranges. Additionally, as γ tending to be 0 or +∞, (1− e−φγ)
will tend to be 0 or 1, which can accord with practice. In
summary, these facts indicate that it is accurate enough to
estimate the exact secrecy rate using this formula, which is
given by
Cs = Is (γb, γe) ≈
{
e−φγe − e−φγb , γb > γe
0, γb ≤ γe.
(10)
Substituting Equ. (10) into Equ. (8), the expression for the
approximated ergodic secrecy rate can be developed, that is
C¯s ≈
∫ +∞
0
∫ +∞
γe
(
e−φγe − e−φγb) fb (γb) fe (γe) dγbdγe
=
∫ +∞
0
∫ +∞
γe
e−φγefb (γb) fe (γe) dγbdγe︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ1
−
∫ +∞
0
∫ +∞
γe
e−φγbfb (γb) fe (γe) dγbdγe︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ2
.
(11)
Using Equ. (3) and Equ. (5), the approximated ergodic secrecy
rate can be derived as
C¯s ≈
NANB−1∑
k=0
NE−1∑
j=0
NANBNE
γ¯e
(
NANB − 1
k
)(
NE − 1
j
)
× (−1)
k+j
φ+ j+1γ¯e +
k+1
γ¯b
(
1
k + 1
− 1
k + 1 + φγ¯b
)
.
(12)
We first look into Ψ1 and apply [21, Equ. (1.111)] for the
binomial expansion into Equ. (3) and Equ. (5), then Ψ1 can
be written as
Ψ1 =
NANBNE
γ¯bγ¯e
∫ +∞
0
(
1− e−γeγ¯e
)NE−1
e−
γe
γ¯e e−φγedγe
×
∫ +∞
γe
(
1− e−
γb
γ¯b
)NANB−1
e
− γb
γ¯b dγb
=
NANB−1∑
k=0
NE−1∑
j=0
NANBNE
γ¯bγ¯e
(
NANB − 1
k
)(
NE − 1
j
)
×
∫ +∞
0
e−(φ+
j+1
γ¯e
)γedγe
∫ +∞
γe
e
−
(
j+1
γ¯b
)
γbdγb︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ3(j,k)
,
(13)
in which Ψ3 (j, k) is easy to solve for it only contains expo-
nential functions. On the other hand,Ψ2 can be also calculated
following the similar steps as Ψ1. Next, substituting Ψ1 and
Ψ2 into Equ. (11) and performing some basic mathematical
manipulations, the final result in Equ. (12) can be derived.
This subsection has detailedly investigated the scenario
when CSIE is available at the transmitter and the approxi-
mated closed-form expression for the ergodic secrecy rate is
derived. The next subsection, therefore, moves on to discuss
the situation when the transmitter knows nothing about the
CSIE.
B. NCSIE
When the CSI of the eavesdropper is unknown at the trans-
mitter, the secrecy rate defined in Equ. (7) is not achievable
[20]. Under this circumstance, the secrecy performance is
usually measured by the secrecy outage probability (SOP),
which is defined as
Pout (Rs) = Pr (Cs < Rs) , (14)
where Rs ≥ 0 represents the preset secrecy rate. According
to the definition of SOP, it is clear that SOP denotes the
probability that the achievable secrecy rate is less than a
predetermined secrecy transmission rate, below which secure
transmission is not guaranteed.
1) Probability of non-zero secrecy: Before explaining the
general SOP (for Rs > 0), we first examine the condition
of positive secrecy rate i.e., the probability of taking positive
values for the secrecy rate Cs. On the basis of Equ. (7)
and Equ. (14), the probability of non-zero secrecy rate is
formulated as
Pr (Cs > 0) = 1− Pout (0) = Pr (γb > γe)
=
∫ +∞
0
∫ +∞
γe
fb (γb) fe (γe) dγbdγe.
(15)
By substituting Equ. (3) and Equ. (5) into Equ. (15) and
calculating the resultant integrals on the basis of [21, Equ.
(3.432.1)], the closed-form expression for the probability of
positive secrecy rate can be obtained, namely
Pr (Cs > 0) =
NANB−1∑
k=0
NE−1∑
j=0
(−1)k+j
(k + 1) γ¯e
NANBNE
j+1
γ¯e
+ k+1γ¯b
×
(
NANB − 1
k
)(
NE − 1
j
)
.
(16)
2) General secrecy outage probability: On the basis of
the definition of the secrecy rate and the secrecy outage
probability, the expression of the SOP is given by
Pout (Rs) =Pr (Cs < Rs|γb > γe) Pr (γb > γe)
+ Pr (Cs < Rs|γb < γe) Pr (γb < γe) .
(17)
By Equ. (7), Cs is 0 when γb < γe; on the other hand, the
preset Rs is positive, thus Pr (Cs < Rs|γb < γe) equals to 1.
As a result, the SOP can be simplified as
Pout (Rs) =Pr (Cs < Rs|γb > γe)
× Pr (γb > γe) + Pr (γb < γe) .
(18)
In Equ. (18), the final results for both Pr (γb < γe) and
Pr (γb > γe) can be directly obtained using Equ. (16). Next,
let us turn to the term Pr (Cs < Rs|γb > γe). On the basis of
[20], Pr (Cs < Rs|γb > γe) can be expressed as
Pr (Cs < Rs|γb > γe)
=
1
Θ
∫ +∞
0
∫ I−1(Rs+I(γe))
γe
fb (γb) fe (γe) dγbdγe
=
1
Θ
∫ +∞
0
∫ I−1(Rs+I(γe))
0
fb (γb) fe (γe) dγbdγe︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ4
− 1
Θ
∫ +∞
0
∫ γe
0
fb (γb) fe (γe) dγbdγe︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ5
,
(19)
where Θ = Pr (γb > γe) and I−1 (·) denotes the inverse
function of I (·). Note that Ψ5 = 1−Pr (γb > γe) which can
be simply solved by Equ. (16). As for Ψ4, the approximated
formula
(
1− e−φγ) can be utilized to simplify its calculation,
since the inverse function of I (γ) is difficult to derive.
Consequently,
Ψ4 ≈
∫ +∞
0
∫ − ln(e−φγe−Rs)/φ
0
fb (γb) fe (γe) dγbdγe (20)
We substitute Equ. (3) and Equ. (5) into Equ. (20) and expand
the PDF by the binomial expansion. After some lines of
derivation, the approximated result for Ψ4 is given by
Ψ4 ≈
1−
NANB−1∑
k=0
NE−1∑
j=0
(−1)k+j
k + 1
NANBNE
γ¯eφ
(
NANB − 1
k
)
×
(
NE − 1
j
)
(−Rs)vk B (uj , 1) 2F1
(
−vk, uj;uj + 1; 1
Rs
)
,
(21)
in which vk =
1+k
γ¯bφ
and uj =
1+j
γ¯eφ
. Besides, B (·, ·) and
2F1 (·, ·; ·; ·) denote the Beta function [21, Equ. (8.380)] and
Gauss hypergeometric function [21, Equ. (9.100)], respec-
tively. Afterwards, substituting the results of Ψ4 and Ψ5 into
Equ. (19) and performing some mathematical manipulations,
the approximated expression of the SOP can be obtained,
which is exhibited on the top of next page.
Let Rs and γ¯e be fixed, and the secrecy outage probability
will tend to be 0 as γ¯b → +∞ when the input signals follow
Gaussian distribution [6], for the channel capacity of the main
channel can increase monotonically without any limitation. In
contrast with the Gaussian inputs, the maximal input-output
MI of the main channel is a constant for the digital-modulation
systems due to the constraint of finite constellation size. Next,
we still take BPSK as an example and evaluate the asymptotic
SOP when γ¯b → +∞. By Equ. (6), the MI for the main
channel will tend to be 1 as γ¯b rises up, thus the asymptotic
SOP can be written as
P∞out (Rs) = Pr (1− I (γe) < Rs) = Pr
(
γe > I−1 (1−Rs)
)
= 1−
(
1− e−I
−1(1−Rs)
γ¯e
)NE
.
(23)
Since I−1 (·) is hard to solve, the approximated expression(
1− e−φγ) can be used to approximate the final result, thus
the asymptotic SOP can be estimated as
P∞out (Rs) ≈ 1−
(
1−Rs 10.6507γ¯e
)NE
. (24)
As can be seen from Equ. (24), γ¯b,NA andNB have no impact
on the the asymptotic SOP. Nevertheless, on the basis of [6],
the asymptotic SOP for Gaussian inputs when γ¯b → +∞ is
P∞out (Rs) = (Aγ¯b)
−G
+ o
(
γ¯−Gb
)
, (25)
where A is only related with γ¯e and NE, o (·) denotes higher
order terms and G = NANB. According to [6], G is termed
as secrecy diversity order, which represents the slope of the
SOP curve. On the basis of our asymptotic result, the secrecy
diversity order for finite-alphabet inputs has degraded from
NANB into 0 for P
∞
out (Rs) is irrelevant to γ¯b, which is totally
different from the scenario of Gaussian inputs. It is clear that
the maximal MI for the main channel is a constant related
with the modulation modes, which has nothing to do with γ¯b
due to the limitation of finite constellation size. And this is
just the reason why P∞out (Rs) is unaffected by γ¯b, causing the
secrecy diversity order to be 0.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, numerical and simulation results derived in
the preceding sections are given. As stated before, there is
no closed-form expression for the ergodic secrecy rate, thus
Monte-Carlo simulations with a large number of trials are
utilized to approach the exact value, which will be used to
examine the feasibility and validity of the former derivations.
Let us fix NB = 3, NE = 2 and increase NA from 1
to 16. Besides, the average SNR at the eavesdropper is set
Pr (Cs < Rs) ≈ 1−
NANB−1∑
k=0
NE−1∑
j=0
(−1)k+j+vk
k + 1
NANBNE
γ¯eφ
(
NANB − 1
k
)(
NE − 1
j
)
Rvks B (uj , 1) 2F1
(
−vk, uj;uj + 1; 1
Rs
)
(22)
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Fig. 2. Simulated and approximated (◦) ergodic secrecy capacity versus γ¯b
for NB = 3, NE = 2 and γ¯e = −10 dB.
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Fig. 3. Simulated and analytical probability of non-zero secrecy capacity
versus γ¯b for NA = 3, NB = NE = 2.
to be γ¯e = −10 dB as γ¯b ranges between -15 dB and 10
dB. Fig. 2 presents the results of simulated and approximated
ergodic secrecy rate, obtained by Monte-Carlo experiments
and Equ. (12) respectively. As shown in Fig. 2, the curves
denoting the simulated results nearly coincide with the circles
denoting the approximated results, which suggests that the
former derivation about the ergodic secrecy rate in Section
III-A is correct. In addition, the coincidence of the curves also
indicates that the approximated formula of the MI for BPSK
serves as a efficient tool that can be utilized to simplify some
derivations. Finally, comparing the curves for different NA,
it can be observed that the larger the NA, the more secrecy
transmission rate the antenna selection system can achieve
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Fig. 4. Simulated and approximated secrecy outage secrecy versus γ¯b for
NB = 3, NE = 2.
even though the total number of the RF chains is fixed.
Next, let us turn to the scenario when the CSI of the
eavesdropper is unavailable at the transmitter. In the following
part, the simulation and numerical results for the probability
of non-zero secrecy rate will be presented first, then we
will turn to the secrecy outage probability. Fig. 3 compares
the simulated and analytical probability of non-zero secrecy
rate versus γ¯b. The analytical results are calculated by Equ.
(16) and the simulated results are obtained by Monte-Carlo
experiments. To approach the exact probability of non-zero
secrecy rate, the Monte-Carlo experiments consist of 107 trails.
It can be seen form Fig. 3 that the analytical results meet
accurately with the simulation results, which further verifies
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Fig. 5. Simulated and approximated limit secrecy outage secrecy versus γ¯e
for γ¯b = 30 dB, NE = NB = 2 and NA = 5.
the former derivation. Furthermore, the probability decreases
with the increment of γ¯e but increases as γ¯b rises up, which
suggests the active and passive effect of the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper in the wiretap channel. Note that the
approximated formula of the mutual information is not utilized
during the derivation of the probability of non-zero secrecy
capacity, thus the derived results just represent the exact values
of the probability.
Then, Fig. 4 provides the simulated and approximated
results for the secrecy outage probability in terms of γb as NA
increases from 1 to 8 and γe ranges between -10 dB and -6 dB.
As shown in Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b), the approximated SOP,
calculated by Equ. (22), agrees well with the simulated results,
which supports our approximate derivations in Section III-B.
As explained in the previous section, the SOP can not tend to
be 0 with the increment of γ¯b due to the limitation of finite-
alphabet inputs, and this phenomenon can be clearly observed
from Fig. 4(b). Overall, taken the results in Fig. 2 and Fig. 4
together, it makes sense to apply the approximation expression(
1− e−0.6507γ) into the estimation of secrecy performance for
wiretap channel with BPSK/QPSK modulations.
As stated before, the SOP can not decrease continuously
with the increment of γ¯b when γ¯e is fixed. To further explore
the asymptotic behavior of the wiretap channel, Fig. 5 plots the
asymptotic SOP versus γ¯e. Moreover, γ¯b is fixed to 30 dB to
make sure the mutual information of the main channel reaches
1. As can be seen from this graph, the asymptotic SOP will
increase as γ¯e rises up. In addition, the approximated results
and the simulated results nearly equal to each other, which
verifies the validity of the deduction.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper detailedly analyzes the secrecy perfor-
mance of antenna-selection-aided MIMOME channels under
BPSK/QPSK modulations. Approximated expressions for the
ergodic secrecy rate and SOP are proposed and discussed
in the situations when the CSIE is available or unavailable.
Simulation shows that the approximated results indicated high
precision and can serve as the estimation in the practical wire-
tap channel. Additionally, discussion about the SOP suggests
that the finite alphabet input is the main limitation of the
security and reliability in digital-modulation systems.
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